Gopalakrishnan Sundar
In April this year, the Centre introduced the Labour Code on Industrial
Relations Bill, 2015, the second in the series of codes aimed at
consolidating the existing central labour laws.
The code seeks to replace the three principal pieces of legislation
governing industrial relations in the country, namely the Trade Unions
Act, 1926 (the TU Act), the Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act,
1946, and the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (the ID Act).
We argue that the code has been drafted keeping in mind only employer
demands for greater labour market flexibility and labour discipline,
ignoring the longstanding demands of trade unions, and that on account
of such a blinkered approach, the code not only fails to strengthen
labour rights but also weakens them.
Labour flexibility
The ID Act requires industrial establishments employing 100 or more workers to obtain the Centre’s permission before effecting any layoff, retrenchment and closure. The code enhances the threshold number to 300 without any rationale. The revision has the effect of reducing the accountability of employers and exposing a much larger number of workers to arbitrary closures and en masse termination.
The ID Act requires industrial establishments employing 100 or more workers to obtain the Centre’s permission before effecting any layoff, retrenchment and closure. The code enhances the threshold number to 300 without any rationale. The revision has the effect of reducing the accountability of employers and exposing a much larger number of workers to arbitrary closures and en masse termination.
As a trade-off, the code raises the retrenchment/closure compensation
payable to workers from 15 days’ wages for every completed year of
service to 45 days’ wages. At the same time, it leaves avenues open for
avoidance of payment of the statutorily mandated compensation.
The ultimate flexibility provision in the code is the one empowering the
government to exempt any establishment or class of establishments from
any or all the provisions of the code if it is satisfied that adequate
provisions exist for the investigation and settlement of industrial
disputes in respect of workers employed there.
Any exercise of this power could result in workers being deprived of
various basic rights including the right to organise and the right of
access to justice. While a similar provision was inserted into the ID
Act in 1982, it was never brought into force.
The right to strike
The ID Act permits workers in public utility services (PUS) to resort to strike only after they give at least two weeks advance notice. Conciliation proceedings are immediately triggered upon issue of such notice and workers are required to abstain from going on strike during the pendency of the proceedings and seven days thereafter.
On account of these restrictive conditions, it is impossible for workers
in PUS to go on a legal strike. The misuse of the power to classify
industries as PUS has resulted in curbing the right to strike of workers
in a large number of industries that are not really essential.
The code now uniformly places all industrial workers in the same boat as
PUS workers. This means workers in all industries will be governed by
the strict conditions which have so far applied only to PUS workers.
Moreover, the penalties for participating in or instigating or aiding an
illegal strike are very steep, ranging from ₹20,000 to ₹50,000 with
possible imprisonment. These measures significantly reduce the capacity
of workers to go on strike. That apart, the definition of ‘strike’ has
been widened under the code to include casual leave by 50 per cent or
more workers in the industry. Thus, even a coincidental absence by
several workers on a given day may be treated as an illegal strike.
Freedom of association
The TU Act permits outsiders to be office-bearers of trade unions. On the other hand, the code mandates that all the office-bearers of a registered trade union be persons actually engaged or employed in the establishment/industry with which the trade union is concerned. Such a restriction flies in the face of the standards contained in the ILO Convention of Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organize (C.87) as it interferes with and limits the ability of workers to choose the persons they think best to be their leaders. Further, the code prohibits a person holding office in more than 10 unions. This again is contrary to the principles of freedom of association.
The TU Act permits outsiders to be office-bearers of trade unions. On the other hand, the code mandates that all the office-bearers of a registered trade union be persons actually engaged or employed in the establishment/industry with which the trade union is concerned. Such a restriction flies in the face of the standards contained in the ILO Convention of Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organize (C.87) as it interferes with and limits the ability of workers to choose the persons they think best to be their leaders. Further, the code prohibits a person holding office in more than 10 unions. This again is contrary to the principles of freedom of association.
The range of grounds on which the registration of a trade union may be
cancelled is wider under the code than under the Trade Unions Act and
includes the failure to hold bi-annual elections and the failure to
submit annual returns. Thus, the code seeks in many ways to rein in
trade unions and interfere with their internal governance.
The code requires workers who are not members of any trade union to pay
subscription to a workers’ welfare fund established by the government or
the employer. While one possible justification for this measure would
be that it encourages workers to join trade unions, the requirement of
compulsory contribution is not just incompatible with the freedom of
choice but also raises issues of propriety.
TUs and collective bargaining
The TU Act merely provides for voluntary registration and not recognition of trade unions. This legal vacuum has resulted in the non-recognition of many representative unions and led to unions waging prolonged struggles for recognition. The ILO Governing Body’s Committee on Freedom of Association has therefore recommended that the government consider introducing suitable provisions on the subject.
The TU Act merely provides for voluntary registration and not recognition of trade unions. This legal vacuum has resulted in the non-recognition of many representative unions and led to unions waging prolonged struggles for recognition. The ILO Governing Body’s Committee on Freedom of Association has therefore recommended that the government consider introducing suitable provisions on the subject.
The code, however, shockingly neither mandates employer recognition of
representative trade unions nor prescribes any procedure for that. The
lapse becomes even more significant as the code refers at various places
to the recognised negotiating agent or certified bargaining agent.
Further, although the government is obliged to respect and realise the
principles contained in ILO Convention No 98 requiring the promotion of
collective bargaining, the code does not contain any provisions aimed at
promoting collective bargaining.
The reform exercise sought to be achieved through the code is thus
partial and arbitrary. It cannot be expected to promote industrial
governance according to constitutional values and ILO standards.
Gopalakrishnan is an advocate in the Madras High Court; Sundar is a professor at XLRI, Jamshedpur
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