Soumya Kanti Ghosh
The Union budget will be presented in the context of an entrenched
slowdown that is becoming increasingly difficult to overcome. Coupled
with this, the recent increase in inflation (notwithstanding the current
methodology) has complicated the budget-making exercise. We believe
that this budget could make a substantial difference by challenging the
conventional wisdom that does not stand the test of scrutiny.
The primary purpose of the budget is to lay out a receipt-expenditure
statement and thereby the fiscal deficit estimates. This year is,
perhaps, different as the slowdown has derailed the fiscal arithmetic.
Our estimates show that the shortfall might be anywhere between 0.5-0.7
per cent of the GDP in the current fiscal after adjusting for revenue
shortfall and expenditure rationalisation.
Given that the government is now facing such a huge mismatch, the
fiscal deficit glide path is likely to be recalibrated. But, here lies
strong resistance from the votaries of fiscal consolidation, which is
echoed in government circles too with independent reports pegging the
fiscal deficit estimate at 3.5 per cent for 2020-21. We believe the
government must not target a number in FY21 that is not credible and
achievable. The growth dynamics suggest that with a nominal GDP growth
that could be at 10 per cent, a 3.5 per cent target will result in the
absolute fiscal deficit in FY21 being lower than in FY20, and that again
will be unachievable.
In this context, the fiasco in FY12 bears mentioning. The government
wanted to reduce the fiscal deficit from 4.8 per cent of the GDP to 4.6
per cent. But, in absolute terms, the difference between the fiscal
deficit in FY11 and FY12 jumped four times as the 3.3 percentage point
collapse in growth was not factored in. Thus, the temptation of having a
3.5 per cent deficit target in the budget must be avoided at any cost
as we face a similar growth slowdown. Instead, the fiscal deficit must
be kept only at a marginally lower level or the same level in FY21
(vis-à-vis FY20). We must focus on growth. A large fiscal compression in
the budget, through a reported expenditure curtailment of Rs 2 lakh
crore, could be an unmitigated disaster for growth and will definitely
raise the possibility of lack of transparency in the fiscal numbers of
FY21 in the eyes of the market.
So, what are the options before the government? First, is the
apparent trade-off between tax concessions and stimulating the economy
by giving a fillip to the rural economy. There is now an apparent
consensus that with only 4 per cent of people paying income tax, a tax
concession might be a wrong approach to stimulate demand. There are,
however, two fallacies with this argument. First, even when 2 per cent
of the people paid income tax during 2004-08, the Indian economy
expanded by close to 8 per cent on average. Second, the 4 per cent
population accounted for a significant part of overall consumption, and
in FY19, the overall gross taxable income of this population was Rs 46
lakh crore, which is 40.8 per cent of the overall private final
consumption expenditure. Hence, it is possible to tweak both the slabs
and the tax rates to increase consumption, which is key to growth. The
only issue with such tax changes that could make the government wary is
the revenue foregone. Our estimates suggest that a 5 per cent cut in
taxes across income buckets can result in a revenue shortfall of only
0.5 per cent of GDP.
Second, the idea of a rural push through PM-KISAN scheme is
understandable, but efforts must first be made to cover all the farmers
under the scheme. It is quite puzzling that despite 92 per cent of the
land records being digitised, PM-KISAN still covers only half of the
eligible beneficiaries. As was promised in the 2018 budget, a tenancy
certificate must be issued to every tenant farmer — 70 per cent of
farmland is cultivated by tenant farmers, who are not entitled to any
benefit because they do not own land. Third, the government should think
about increasing the Rs 6,000 yearly amount in a calibrated manner (say
Rs 500 per year over the next four years) as the incremental cost will
be negligible. As this will create a feel-good factor across the farming
community, why not start from this year itself?
Third, the government must think about the trade-off between tax
adjustment and incentivising savings. When the government notified an
increase in the public provident fund (PPF) limit by Rs 50,000 to Rs
1,50,000 in August 2014, its impact on household savings was enormous.
For example, an increase in the 80C limit by Rs 1 lakh to Rs 2.5 lakh
for individual households will lead to additional savings of more than
Rs 2 lakh crore as compared to a revenue and interest foregone amount of
Rs 40,000 crore. The question is thus of incentivising consumption, or
savings or both?
In this context, let me also comment on the repeated fallacies of
commentators who advocate in favour of fiscal conservatism on the ground
that entire household financial savings are being used to finance
government borrowings. The numbers suggest otherwise. Of the Rs 11.2
lakh crore of net financial savings in FY18, total claims on government
were around Rs 70,000 crore, while Rs 7.74 lakh crore were claims on
insurance, pension and provident funds (assuming FY17 ratios). Household
claims on pension, insurance and provident funds are purely savings for
the households’ retirement corpus and it is completely naïve to equate
such claims as financing government borrowings. The decision of such
retirement funds on where to invest their corpus is a purely
portfolio-decision, just as is the household decision to investment in
small savings.
Apart from such fiscal measures, the budget must announce its intent
to bring back trust in the financial system. To this end, a simultaneous
recognition of stressed assets of NBFCs and thereafter immediately
initiating measures to help them to raise capital by initiating
takeovers/mergers if required and giving the rest a clean chit, thereby,
increasing the confidence to lend, is required. We must not repeat the
mistake we made with banks when we first initiated recognition of bad
loans through the asset quality review in 2015, then brought resolution
through the IBC law in 2016, and then resorted to recapitalisation in
October 2017. The sequence should have been resolution first, and
recognition and recapitalisation simultaneously thereafter.
We can also think of forbearance for large NBFCs by deferment of
principal repayments by systemically important NBFCs and HFCs. These
NBFCs and HFCs can allow similar deferments to their clients. Since
interest would be paid during this period, lenders would not make a
loss. This should be adequate to get the cash flows from stuck projects
going and to ensure the fulfillment of the prime minister’s vision of
Housing for All by 2022.
Interestingly, as we write on the budget priorities, the Supreme
Court judgment on telcos’ adjusted gross revenues could just about tilt
the budget arithmetic in the government’s favour. On the flip side
though, this order could lead to significant market disruptions and
possibly impact consumption as well.
This article first appeared in the print edition on
January 21, 2020 under the title “The deficit bogey”. The writer is
group chief economic advisor, State Bank of India. Views are personal.
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